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Nextcloud/Collabora RCE: attackers searched for crypto wallets

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A vulnerability in a Nextcloud document-editing application has been actively exploited to plant PHP webshells. On at least one compromised server, attackers subsequently searched for files associated with cryptocurrency wallets and password vaults. The critical flaw, CVE-2026-110447 (CVSS v4.0: 9.2/10), affects Collabora Online – Built-in CODE Server, the optional Nextcloud app richdocumentscode, not every Collabora installation.

On 23 October 2026, CISA added this vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. A fix had already been available since September. That means administrators should consider not only patching promptly but also checking whether a previously exposed server was compromised before the patch was applied.

The immediate action: upgrade richdocumentscode to 26.4.303 or newer, or completely remove the app if it is not required. Simply disabling it does not mitigate the issue, according to Collabora. Patching does not automatically remove previously installed webshells.

Exactly which component is vulnerable?

Collabora provides browser-based office document editing within Nextcloud. It can be deployed in different ways:

  • richdocuments: the Nextcloud Office integration, which may connect to a separate Collabora server.
  • richdocumentscode: the optional Collabora Online – Built-in CODE Server app, which installs and starts a CODE server locally.
  • Standalone Collabora Online, including independently deployed Docker or operating-system packages: not affected by this specific CVE, according to the vendor.

In its 14 October security advisory GHSA-g3vx-3m76-fghh, Collabora confirms that richdocumentscode versions earlier than 26.4.303 are affected and 26.4.303 is fixed.

For end-of-life Nextcloud 29 and older, installing the fixed app release may not be supported. The vendor advises upgrading Nextcloud or removing the built-in app. Running Nextcloud, or only the richdocuments integration without richdocumentscode, is therefore not evidence of exposure to this particular issue.

How does CVE-2026-110447 work?

The defect is an OS command injection (CWE-78) in the built-in app's proxy.php script. Attacker-influenced HTTP request data can reach a command used to start the local CODE process. In the vulnerable condition, this allows operating-system commands to run with the privileges of the web server account.

An attacker needs no authentication and no user interaction, but there is an important prerequisite: the built-in CODE process must not already be running, such as during a restart, upgrade or crash.

This conditional attack window is still serious. Production systems restart for maintenance, updates or recovery, and an attacker who can reach the endpoint may exploit such a moment.

This is also distinct from CVE-2025-66208: Collabora explicitly warns that fixing that older issue does not protect against CVE-2026-110447.

Timeline: exploitation preceded the formal security advisory

Public records provide an unusually clear sequence:

  • 10 September 2026: earliest malicious requests shown in logs shared by administrators.
  • 11 September: the fixed app version, 26.4.303, was released.
  • 3 October: a Nextcloud community warning urged users to upgrade because webshells had already been reported.
  • 14 October: publication of Collabora's advisory and CVE-2026-110447.
  • 15–16 October: independent analyses from BleepingComputer and Censys.
  • 23 October: addition to CISA KEV, confirming documented exploitation in the wild.

CISA directives can impose requirements on US federal agencies, but a KEV deadline is not automatically a matching legal deadline for every French business. The catalog entry is still a strong signal for security prioritisation.

What administrators actually observed on compromised servers

In Collabora richdocumentscode issue #354, administrators of multiple Nextcloud instances published logs and observations describing attacks targeting /apps/richdocumentscode/proxy.php?status, including unusually encoded paths and obfuscated request content.

The attackers successfully wrote PHP webshell scripts into the app directory. Reported filenames included patterns such as shx*.php and shrf*.php. Another administrator reported an unexpected file named Nx_33143.php that was highlighted by the Nextcloud integrity checker. These are examples of observed artefacts, not an exhaustive indicator set.

Once a webshell was reachable, the recorded follow-up activity included searches for high-value files and directories:

  • wallet.dat and wallet-related directories such as .bitcoin, .electrum, .ethereum and .monero;
  • keystore.json, a filename that may indicate a key or wallet export depending on format;
  • KeePass password database files (*.kdbx);
  • terms referring to Bitwarden and 1Password.

The forensic distinction matters: searching is not the same as finding, and finding does not by itself prove exfiltration. The HTTP requests reviewed by the original reporter did not demonstrate file uploads, archived data transfers or stolen funds. However, an active webshell could potentially read or change anything accessible to the web server account. Sensitive data within that account's reach should therefore be treated as potentially exposed pending investigation.

Why a document server can threaten crypto self-custody

A hardware wallet and non-custodial signing process can provide strong protection for transactions, but they do not make it safe to keep seed phrases, wallet backups, keystore files or exported password vaults in a compromised collaborative service.

A malicious process normally inherits the filesystem permissions and isolation boundaries of the account under which it runs. The real consequences therefore depend on how users, directories, containers, volumes, backup data and application secrets are separated.

For example:

  • a plaintext seed phrase in a location readable by the compromised service may invalidate a wallet's protection;
  • an encrypted backup might be copied, but its usefulness depends on the encryption scheme and password strength, which must be assessed separately;
  • an indicative filename does not prove that an accessible, usable private key was obtained.

This illustrates principles central to GLOV Secure: keeping control of assets also requires securing every copy of their secrets and all paths through which those secrets can be accessed. Our article on access security and responsibility addresses the organisational side of this problem.

A practical response plan for Nextcloud administrators

1. Establish whether the app is actually installed

Inventory production, backup and test instances and check specifically for richdocumentscode. From the Nextcloud installation directory, the administrative command php occ app:list, executed using the appropriate service account, can list installed apps. Paths, identities and supported commands depend on the deployment.

If the installed richdocumentscode version is 26.4.302 or earlier, prioritise correction even when the app is currently shown as disabled.

2. Upgrade or completely remove the app

Install richdocumentscode 26.4.303 or later and verify the deployed files and running services. If the app is unnecessary, fully uninstall or remove it using supported procedures.

For Nextcloud 29 and older, upgrade Nextcloud or remove the app if the fixed release is incompatible. Ensure restorable backups of the application, configuration and data before planned changes.

A WAF rule or simply disabling the app is not a reliable replacement for the vendor fix.

3. Hunt for historical traces and integrity warnings

If an affected app version has been exposed since 10 September 2026, review retained HTTP and reverse-proxy logs for that period, looking for:

  • unusual requests to /apps/richdocumentscode/proxy.php, especially those containing abnormal or encoded path elements;
  • unexpected PHP files in the app's directory, including the apps or custom_apps paths as applicable;
  • Nextcloud file-integrity warnings;
  • unexpected outbound communication, web-server child processes and other anomalous system events.

The public reports include encoded path traversal (%2e%2e) and webshell names resembling shx*.php. Not finding those indicators is not proof of a clean system, while a suspicious request alone may only indicate an unsuccessful probe. Correlation is required.

4. Preserve evidence before cleaning up

If compromise is suspected, record timestamps, retain logs, preserve copies of suspicious files and hash relevant evidence. Avoid immediately deleting webshells or reinstalling the server before an authorised investigation can collect necessary material.

Scope the web-server account's effective permissions, readable volumes and secrets, and the probable exposure window. Then coordinate containment, session revocation, targeted secret rotation, trusted restoration and heightened monitoring.

When crypto assets may be involved, follow a controlled migration process such as the one outlined in our guide to migrating a potentially compromised wallet. Never enter a seed phrase on a suspicious server merely to check a backup or balance.

What the evidence does not show

An unpatched app version does not prove compromise. The public reports establish webshell installation and searches for wallet and password-manager artefacts, not a verified count of stolen wallets or actual transfers of crypto funds.

Some reports mentioned ransomware, but BleepingComputer said it could not independently verify that claim. Counts of internet-visible installations also cannot be equated with confirmed victims.

Finally, Collabora's standalone server is not affected by this specific vulnerability, according to the vendor. Claims that all Nextcloud or all Collabora deployments are vulnerable would be inaccurate.

The GLOV Solutions perspective: keep secrets out of collaborative systems

This incident highlights a familiar security issue in a concrete way: a document-editing server can become an entry point to secrets that should never share its access boundary.

For GLOV Consulting, it demonstrates the importance of dependency inventories, privilege boundaries and operational recovery. It also complements our PHP2Shell patching analysis: installing an update cannot substitute for investigating possible earlier compromise.

For GLOV Secure, the lesson for self-custody is straightforward: digital-asset protection must encompass copies of secrets, backups and recovery workflows, not just the wallet or hardware signer.

GLOV Solutions editorial analysis — information checked as of 26 October 2026. No compromise of GLOV systems is alleged.

Official sources and independent technical analysis

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